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INTERPRETATION OF THE CAPITOL GROUNDS EX-
TENSION LAW.
The Iowa Supreme Court on Deeember 15, 1913, unani-
mously concurring in an opinion by Hon. Seott M. Ladd, one of
its members, sustained in all its essential parts Chapter 14,
Aets of the 35th General Assembly. The opinion follows :
Appeal from District Court, Polk County, J. H. Applegate, Judge.
Action by citizens of Van Buren and Wapello Counties to enjoin the
executive council of the state from purchasing certain real estate
and from issuing interest-bearing certificates in payment thereof as
authorized by chapter 14 of the Acts of the Thirty-Fifth General
Assembly. Decree was entered enjoining the issuance of certiflcates
in payment of said property; otherwise the relief prayed was denied.
Both parties appeal, that of defendants being first perfected. Re-
versed.
LADD, J. The executive council of the state consists of the
Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of State, and the Auditor
of State. It employs a secretary. The object of this action is to
enjoin the executive council as such and each member thereof from
acquiring for the state the property described in and issuing the
certificates authorized by chapter 14 of the Acts of the Thirty-Fifth
General Assembly, for that, as is contended, the provisions thereof
are in violation of sections 2 and 5 of the seventh article of the Con-
stitution of the state. Section 2 of the act in question authorizes
and directs the executive council, for the purpose of extending the
capitoi grounds, to "purchase from time to time within said period
of ten years any or all of the real estate not already owned by the
state" appearing on the annexed plat.
Lots 1 to 6, inclusive, in block 5, four lots in block 4, and five
lots in block 7 belong to the state as, of course, does the tract on
which the capitol building is located. The purchase directed is of
all other lots in the plat. With streets vacated there are over 50
acres in all and, if laid out and improved, as required, in accord-
ance with the Allison Memorial Commission plan on file in the
office of the Secretary of State made a part of the act by section 3,
the grounds undoubtedly would be artistic and of great beauty.
For the purpose of acquiring the land necessary and improving the
grounds, section 1 of the act provides that "there shall be levied
annually for a period of ten (10) years, commencing with the first
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levy made after the passage of this act, a special tax as follows; in
each oí the years 1913 and 1914, one-half mill on the dollar of the
taxable property in the state, and in each of the remaining eight
years such rate of levy to be fixed by the executive council as will
yield approximately one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,-
000) annually. The proceeds of such levies shall be carried into
the state treasury to the credit of a fund to be called the capitol
grounds extension and improvement fund. The amount so realized
by said levies shall be in lieu of all of the appropriations for said
purposes during the said period of ten years." Section 4 authorizes
the executive council to acquire any or all of said real estate for
the state and in so doing purchase same "on option, contracts or
in any other way which said council may deem expedient, • * *
at any time within said period of ten years at its discretion and as
the amount of money in said fund at any time may enable them
to do. Payment for said real estate may be made by said executive
council certifying to the State Auditor the amount due to any per-
son at any time and the auditor then drawing a warrant in his
favor on the State Treasurer out of the fund herein created." Section
5 relates to condemnation of any property the council is unable to
purchase, and section 6 to the leasing of property purchased until
buildings thereupon are removed and the disposition of said build-
ings, the proceeds to be included in the said fund. Section 7 directs
the sale of a tract of land known as Governor Square, the proceeds to
be turned into said fund, and section 8 declares that no part of the
purchase price nor warrants or certificates issued therefor or inter-
est thereon shall be paid otherwise than from said fund.
Were the lots to be paid only from this fund known as the
capitol extension and improvement fund derived from the source
mentioned on warrants drawn on the state treasury, the foregoing
sections, it will be noted in passing, are complete in themselves
and adequate for the objects intended. The sections following re-
late entirely to the anticipation of part or all of said fund. Section
9 enacts: "That for the purpose of accomplishing the earliest
possible completion of the work contemplated herein and the carry-
ing out of the plans provided for in this act, the executive council
may anticipate the collection of the tax herein authorized to be levied
for the extension and improvement of the capitol grounds, and for
that purpose may issue interest-bearing warrants or certificates carry-
ing a rate of interest not to exceed five per cent, per annum to be
denominated 'capitol grounds extension and improvement warrants
or certificates' and said warrants or certificates and interest there-
on shall be secured by said assessment and levy and shall be pay-
able out of the respective funds hereinbefore named, pledged to the
payment of the same, and no warrants shall be issued in excess of
taxes authorized or to be levied to secure the payment of the same.
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It shall he the duty of the State Treasurer to collect said several
funds and to hold the same separate and apart in trust for the pay-
ment of said warrants or certiflcates and interest and to apply the
proceeds of said funds pledged for that purpose to the payment of
said warrants or certiflcates and interest. Such warrants or cer-
tiflcates shall be issued in sums of not less than one hundred nor
more than one thousand dollars each running not more than ten
years bearing interest not exceeding flve per cent, per annum,
payable annually or semi-annually and shall be substantially in the
following form." Following this is a form of such certiflcate, not
necessary to be set out. Section 10 directs that the certiflcates be
Issued only in pursuance of a resolution of the executive council
specifying conditions as to amount, rate of interest and the like.
Section 11 provides for the registry of said certiflcates, with the
Treasurer of State, and section 12 authorizes the sale thereof at not
less than par value. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the
entire act is in violation of sections 2 and 5 of article 7 of the Con-
stitution of the state, in that it authorized the creation of an in-
debtedness in excess of that therein permitted, without submitting
the question to a vote of the people. These constitutional pro-
visions may as well be set out:
"Sec. 2. The state may contract debts to supply casual deflcits
or failures in revenues; or to meet expenses not otherwise pro-
vided for; but the aggregate amount of such debts, direct and con-
tingent whether contracted by virtue of one or more acts of the
general assembly, or at different periods of time, shall never exceed
the sum of two hundred and flfty thousand dollars; and the money
arising from the creation of such debts shall he applied to the
purpose for which it was obtained, or to repay the debts so con-
tracted, and to no other purpose whatever."
"Sec. 5. Except the debts hereinbefore specifled in this article,
no debt shall be hereafter contracted hy, or on behalf of the state,
unless such debt shall he authorized by some law for some single
work or object, to be distinctly specifled therein; and such law shall
impose, and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax,
suflicient to pay the interest on such deht, as it falls due, and also
to pay and discharge the principal of such debt, within twenty years
from the tjime of the contracting thereof; but no such law shall
take effect until at a general election it shall have been submitted to
the people, and have received a majority of all the votes cast for
and against it at such election; and all money raised by authority
of such law, shall be applied only to the speciflc object therein
stated, or to the payment of the debt created thereby; and such law
shall he published in at least one newspaper in each county, if one
is published therein throughout the state, for three months preced-
ing the election at which it is. submitted to the people."
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In determining whether the act in authorizing the issuance of
Interest-bearing certificates or warrants is inimical to these pro-
visions of the Constitution, several questions necessarily are in-
volved: (1) Would these certificates, if issued, constitute "expenses
not otherwise provided for" within the meaning of section 2 of
article 7 of the Constitution? (2) Can the executive council antic-
ipate the revenues collectible within the biennial period by the
issuance of certificates in advance payable therefrom as authorized
without creating a debt within the meaning of these sections?
(3) If these inquiries be answered in the aflirmativè, should the
act be interpreted as empowering the executive council to issue
certificates in anticipation of current revenues and in an amount
beyond these not exceeding $250,000, or equaling the collectible taxes
during the entire ten years within which levies are directed to be
made? (4) If the latter be the true construction, then does the
act authorize the creation of a debt in excess of the constitutional
limitation?
I. Plainly enough, the certificates contemplated in section 9 of
the act were not intended " to supply casual deficits or failure in
revenues." Might they be issued "to meet expenses not otherwise
provided for"? The state was created by the people to perform for
them certain functions, the necessity for the performance of which
was the only object of its creation. These are in part defined in the
Constitution and more fully In the statutes. The three co-ordinate
branches of government created for the protection and well-being
of the people must be maintained and afforded facilities and equip-
ment essential to the efficient discharge of the duties devolving up-
on them. The insane and feeble-minded are to be cared for, those
convicted of crime restrained of their liberty, the free school system
maintained, opportunities for higher education afforded, and in-
stitutions provided for the deaf, dumb, and blind, as well as for such
others as the humane sentiments of modern life deem proper sub-
jects for the care of the state. The attainment of these objects in-
volves the exercise of great business sagacity and the expenditure
of large sums of money, and the manifest design of the people in
inserting this clause in the Constitution was to enable those charged
with the duty of providing necessary funds for the maintenance of
the government to exercise some discretion in distributing the
burden of taxation, in event unusual or extraordinary expenditures
are deemed necessary beyond the period for which ordinary revenues
are provided. To meet expenses not otherwise provided for—that is,
not made available in sonie other or different way or manner—the
General Assembly is authorized to incur an indebtedness to a
limited amount precisely as is done in the exigencies of private
business. In other words, the state is not denied.the advantage of
postponing payment of expenses which may be extraordinary or
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unusual which are found beneficial in the ordinary enterprises of
life. The objects for which "expenses" may be incurred are not
defined, but left to the discretion of those endowed with the power
of incurring them. "Expense" is defined in Webster's Dictionary
as meaning "that which is expended, laid out or consumed; outlay;
and hence the burden of expenditure; charge; cost." And "price"
is said to be a synonym. Expenses when incurred is evidently what
is meant, for there could be no expense by the state unless made in
pursuance of law and the debt authorized may be created to meet
such expenses. Manifestly, the levy of a tax collectible in the future
would not constitute a provision for expenses presently created, and
the mere fact that a future levy of taxes is authorized and the col-
lection of these may subsequently be available to discharge the
obligation assumed in the present expenditures does not obviate
right to create debt therefor. In other words, a statute may
authorize expenses to be incurred, and at the same time direct the
issuance of evidence of debt in the way of bonds, warrants, or cer-
tificates, to meet such expenses and in the same act provide for
taxation out of which to extinguish the debt. The act under con-
sideration directs the executive council to purchase the grounds
about the eapitol and thereby to incur an expense. For this purpose,
the levy of one-half of a mill on all taxable property of the state
is ordered for each of the years of the biennial period, 1914 and
1915. Whether the revenue for these years available for the pur-
chase of the grounds will be sufficient was not known. Were this
inadequate, however, there would be no fund to meet this deficiency,
and such deficiency might not be anticipated as will hereafter
appear without incurring an indebtedness by the state. True,
the levy of taxes sufiicient to provide $150,000 per annum
thereafter is authorized by the act, but this might not be available
"for the purpose of accomplishing the earliest possible completion of
the work contemplated."
The manifest design in allowing the executive council to issue
certificates payable out of funds other than those collected during
the biennial period was to assure "the earliest possible completion
of the work," and we are of opinion that any deficiency in the
revenues collectible within that period and available for this pur-
pose would be an expense to meet which a debt against the state
not exceeding $250,000 may be incurred by the issuance of certifi-
cates or warrants in pursuance of the last four sections of the act
under consideration.
II. Certificates or warrants issued in anticipation of revenues
collectible within the biennial period and payable therefrom do not
create a "debt" within the meaning of that term as used in the
Constitution. The General Assembly convenes on the second Mon-
day of January of the odd-numbered' years and provides for reve-
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nues necessary to the performance of the different governmental
functions during the ensuing two years. Its power of taxation is
unlimited, and the taxes authorized to be levied and collected are
legally certain to reach the state treasury, and therefore are as cer-
tainly available to meet the expenses authorized as are those col-
lectible annually by a municipality.
It is well settled in this state that a municipality may anticipate
the collection of taxes, and in defraying ordinary expenses may
make appropriations and incur valid obligations to pay "in advance
of the receipt of its revenues," even though the treasury be empty,
and no actual levy made, and the city be otherwise indebted to the
full limit. Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; Dively v. City
of Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 227; French v. City of Burlington, 42 Iowa,
614; Phillips V. Reed, 107 Iowa, 331, 76 N. W. 850, 77 N. W. 1031;
City of Cedar Rapids v. Bechtel, 110 Iowa, 198, 81 N. W. 468. In
some other states the levy of taxes must actually have been made in
order to warrant the anticipation of revenues by issuing warrants
in advance.
In the Phillips Case it was said, in speaking of certain warrants:
"If the city had on hand or in prospect, at the time these warrants
were issued, funds with which to meet them without trenching
upon the rights of creditors for current expenses of the city, then
the warrants were valid, although such funds may have been there-
after wrongfully applied to another purpose."
Warrants issued in anticipation of taxes are held not to constitute
a debt on the theory that nioneys, the receipt of which is certain
from the collection of taxes, are regarded as for all practical pur-
poses already in the treasury and the contracts made upon the
strength thereof are treated as cash transactions. Even though
a municipality is indebted to the constitutional limit, this does not
prevent it from levying such taxes as are authorized by law nor
from issuing warrants within the limits of such levy in anticipation
of their collection, and, if the warrants issued are within the
amounts lawfully levied, they do not create an additional debt. The
proper officers of the state, as the executive council in this state,
may anticipate the revenues to be expended by it which the Legis-
lature has authorized to be collected within the biennial period,
and contracts contemplating the appropriation of these are not re-
garded as debts against the state. As said by Field, C. J., in State
V. McCauley, 15 Cal. 430: "The eighth article (that limiting the
state indebtedness corresponding to this state) was intended to
guard the state from running into debt, and to,keep her expendi-
tures, except in certain cases within her revenues. These revenues
may be appropriated in anticipation of their receipt as effectually
as when actually in the treasury."
The same rule was laid down in State v. Medberry, 7 Ohio St.
529; the court saying: "So long as this financial system is carried
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out in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution (two
years' restriction), unless there is a failure or defect of revenue,
or the General Assembly have failed, for some cause, to provide
revenue sufiîcient to meet the claims against the state, they do not
and cannot accumulate into a debt. Under this system of prompt
payment of expenses and claims as they accrue, there is, undoubted-
ly, after the accruing of the claim, and before its actual presenta-
tion and payment, a period of time intervening in which the claim
exists unpaid; but to hold that for this reason a debt is created
would be the misapplication of the term 'debt,' and substituting for
the fiscal period a point of time between the accruing of a claim and
its payment, for the purpose of finding a debt; but, appropriations
having been previously made and revenue provided for payment as
prescribed by the Constitution, such debts, if they may so be called,
are, in fact, in respect of the fiscal year, provided for, with a view
to immediate adjustment and payment. Such financial transactions
are not therefore to be deemed debts." The same rule was laid
down in State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota was called upon to advise
the Governor of that state concerning the anticipation of the reve-
nue by the issuing of warrants, and in response thereto said: "By
general law, the Legislature has provided for the levy of an annual
tax for meeting the ordinary expenses of the state. By so providing,
in a constitutional manner, for the levy of a sufficient tax, it has
provided a revenue, to the extent of the tax, for the payment of the
ordinary or current expenses of the state. It may then make ap-
propriation of such revenue for diverse and specific purposes, in-
cluded within the ordinary expenses of the state, and may authorize
the issue of evidence of such appropriation in the form of warrants,
without incurring an indebtedness therefor, within the meaning of
said section 2, art. 13, of the Constitution. If this were not so,
then the appropriations of each Legislature in excess of the cash
actually in the hands of the State Treasurer, and in the fund from
which such appropriations were made, would, to the extent of such
excess, constitute the creation of a debf against the state. It is
well understood that the aggregate of the general appropriations of
each Legislature in this, as in other states, generally greatly ex-
ceeds the amount of actual cash in the hands of the State Treasurer
when such appropriations are made. The taxes levied and in
process of collection are treated as in the state treasury, though
not yet actually paid over to the State Treasurer. It has been
ruled in several cases, and by high judicial authority, that state
funds, so in sight, but not yet in hand, may be anticipated and
appropriated as though actually in possession of the State Treasurer.
Critically considered, it may constitute the incurring of an indebted-
ness; but it is not an indebtedness repugnant to the Constitution,
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because its payment i^ s legally provided for by funds constructively
in the treasury. If the drawing of a warrant upon the state
treasury is the incurring of indebtedness by the state, then the
drawing of such warrant would violate the Constitution, even if
there was money in the state treasury to pay it, if the constitutional
limit of indebtedness had been reached; for there must always be
some time intervening between the drawing of the warrant and its
payment, and during such time the indebtedness of the state would
be increased heyond the constitutional limit. Such an interpreta-
tion of the constitutional limitation would obviously be too hyper-
critical to he practicable or reasonable. It being once estahlished,
as we vthink, it is by the authorities already cited, that the reve-
nues of the state, assessed and in process of collection, may be
considered as constructively in the treasury, they may be appro-
priated and treated as though actually and physically there; and an
appropriation of them by the Legislature does not constitute the
incurring of an indebtedness, within the meaning of section 2, art.
13."
See, also. In re Incurring of State Debts, 19 R. I. 610, 37 Atl. 14,
where the court said, in answer to the inquiry from the Governor
as to whether the General Assembly could in time of peace incur
state indebtedness or borrow money in excess of the limit in the
Constitution, that "in thus answering (in the negative) we do not
mean to be understood that the General Assembly may not make
appropriations or authorize the expenditure of money to an amount
exceeding the sum named. The power of taxation resides in the
General Assembly, and therefore it has power to raise by taxation
such sums as it may deem necessary for the expenses of the state
and the public beneflt; and it may appropriate or authorize the
expenditure of the money so raised for the purposes for which they
are raised, and even, as we think, in anticipation of their actual
payment into the state treasury."
The principle seems well established in reason and by authority.
The power of General Assembly to tax is unlimited save by the two.
years' period. Of course, it may enact laws exacting the levy of a
tax annually for any period in the future, but this is always sub-
ject to repeal or modiflcation by subsequent General Assemblies.
But revenues provided for during the biennial period are available
to a legal certainty, for no General Assembly will convene to
repeal or modify within that time. The anticipation then by the
issuance of warrants or certiflcates to be paid therefrom is of the
revenues certainly to be collected, and therefore is in the nature of
a previous appropriation of funds subsequently to reach the
treasury, the setting apart a portion thereof for a specifled purpose,
rather than the creation of an indebtedness against the state.
(To be eontinued in April momber.)

